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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 2006, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels leased
the 157-mile Indiana Toll Road to ITR Concession Company LLC,
a consortium composed of a Spanish and an Australian
company.1 Under the agreement, the private entity paid the
State of Indiana $3.8 billion and promised to operate and
maintain the road for the next seventy-five years in exchange for
various tax breaks and the right to collect toll revenues during
that period.2 As a result of the up-front payment, Indiana has
funding sufficient to meet its transportation needs for the next
ten years. Nonetheless, the deal came under strong criticism,
including from some of the 2008 contenders for Daniels' job,4 in
part because the lease agreement's terms gave the new operators
rights to raise tolls, perhaps substantially. Though a state-
commissioned financial analysis of the proposal assured the
transportation department that the road's $3.8 billion price tag
exceeded what the state could have raised through traditional
bond financing, a competing report alleged that the allowable toll
increases under the new lease actually increased the road's value
to $11 billion,5 suggesting that the state had accepted a price that
greatly underestimated the current value of the road's future
revenue stream.6
1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CASE STUDY: INDIANA TOLL
ROAD, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/casestudies-indianatoll.htm (last visited Jan.
27, 2009).
2 Id.; Daniel Schulman & James Ridgeway, The Highwaymen: Why You Could
Soon Be Paying Wall Street Investors, Australian Bankers, and Spanish Builders for
the Privilege of Driving on American Roads, MOTHER JONES, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 49,
50.
3 GOV'T PERFORMANCE PROJECT, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, GRADING
THE STATES: INDIANA 10 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
PEW WebGuidesIN.pdf.
4 Christin Nance Lazerus, Gubernatorial Foes Slam Toll Road Lease,
MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIB., Apr. 16, 2008, at A4.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS: MORE RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD BETTER SECURE
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST 33 (2008) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
6 Another analysis estimated the value of the concession at $5.35 billion.
Bonney v. Ind. Finance Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473, 478 n.2 (Ind. 2006); see Schulman &
Ridgeway, supra note 2, at 50.
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The Indiana deal is still the largest toll road concession
agreement to date in the United States.' ITR formally assumed
operational responsibility for the toll road on the same day a
concession was signed for Virginia's Pocahontas Parkway,' and
both followed on the heels of a 75-year concession for the
eight-mile Chicago Tollway.9  In November 2007, Colorado
followed the trend, leasing a section of toll road northwest of
Denver to a Portuguese toll road operator. ° In 2008, Mississippi
and Florida both issued requests for proposals for similar
projects.11 The governors of Pennsylvania and Texas attempted
even more ambitious projects. On June 6, 2008, Pennsylvania
Governor Ed Rendell accepted a $12.8 billion bid to lease, repair,
and operate the Pennsylvania Turnpike for seventy-five years to
come; the deal eventually died after a failure to obtain legislative
approval. 12 Texas Governor Rick Perry's original vision for the
Trans-Texas Corridor, announced in 2002, would have included a
$175 billion system of 4,000 miles of corridors, many privately
operated, crisscrossing the state.13 Each corridor was to be
one-quarter mile wide, accommodating toll roads, rail, and utility
lines. '
These states' toll road lease plans did not arise in a vacuum.
Recent road leases are part of a much larger privatization trend
' Elizabeth Carvlin, Indiana Toll-Road Lease Sets a High Bar for Public-Private
Partnerships, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 28, 2006, at 40A.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CASE STUDY: POCAHONTAS
PARKWAY, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/casestudies-pocahontas.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009).
9 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CASE STUDY: CHICAGO SKYWAY,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/case-studies-chicago.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009)
(noting that the City of Chicago signed its agreement on October 28, 2004).
10 Nw. Parkway LLC, About Us, http://www.northwestparkway.org/aboutus.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
" Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Transp., Media Advisory (Aug. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.alligator-alley.com/Documents/PPP%20AA%20RFP%20
Aug%2026%202008%20 2 .pdf; Miss. Dep't of Transp., Airport Parkway Project,
http://www.theairportparkway.com/Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
12 Mark Scolforo, Group Offers $12.8B To Lease Pa. Turnpike: 75-Year
Deal Largest Ever in Toll Road History, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, May 20,
2008, http://www.philly.com/dailynews/national/19092124.html; Paul Nussbaum,
Consortium's Bid To Lease Pa. Turnpike Expires with No Deal, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 1, 2008, at B4.
" Rad Sallee, Transport Network Proposed: Perry Wants Toll Roads, Rail To
Cover State, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 29, 2002, at A15.
14 Id.
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that has expanded from the 1980's through today.15
Governments now look to the private sector to provide a wide
range of goods and services that government itself used to
provide.16 In the face of a widely-recognized need for enormous
infrastructure repairs and the fact that toll roads are ready
income-producing assets capable of attracting investment, it is
natural that states would turn to toll road leasing as one of the
next large-scale moves in privatization.
Bankers and economists have presented often-conflicting
analyses of the economic valuation of the contemporary toll road
leases. Governments and citizens are understandably concerned
that the up-front payment and the services to be performed by a
toll road company accurately reflect the value of the lease, but in
addition to valuation questions, the current crop of toll
road leases raise two fundamental sets of concerns. First,
privatization can raise tensions between conflicting goals within
government programs and the potential for conflicts of interest
between the goals of the public and private entities involved.17
These concerns are magnified in the case of toll road
privatizations, because the extraordinarily long lease terms lock
the parties into agreements that may or may not serve the needs
of the state in the distant future. Second, like prior privatization
efforts, toll road privatizations run the risk of undermining
democratic values, as opportunities for participation and
accountability decline. Already, road privatization projects have
been criticized for the perceived secrecy under which they came
to be.18
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The
States' Role in Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 562 (2005);
Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
383, 384-85 (2006) (discussing privatization of military support services); Matthew
Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1739, 1739 (2002); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting
for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230-31 (2003) (describing school
privatization efforts, including vouchers); David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional
Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19
J.L. & POL. 253, 253 (2003).
17 See infra Part II.D.1.
18 Tony Hartzel, Debate on Toll-Road Reliance in Texas Still Has Miles To Go:
State Needs New Highways, But Is Privatization the Solution?, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 11, 2007, at 1A; Jim Ritchie & Brad Bumstead, Turnpike Lease Process
Tainted, Lawmakers Say, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Mar. 15, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 5127671; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
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The sheer length of toll road lease terms heightens these
concerns and calls for new solutions. Other scholars have
proposed that potential problems posed by privatization can be
resolved by legislation and the careful drafting of contracts.
These tools work well for addressing many aspects of toll road
privatization, and should be used. However, no contract can
anticipate the transportation needs of a state ninety-nine
years into the future. Thus, toll road privatization contracts
should be structured to allow for periodic reconsideration and
renegotiation of key terms in order to maintain a balance
between the needs of the state and the private company.
Part I of this Article describes the current toll road
phenomenon, and Part II provides background about the wider
privatization trend. Part III examines the potential benefits of
toll road privatizations, and the potential problems that may
arise due to tensions between competing goals of the programs
themselves and due to losses in democratic accountability. Part
IV advances specific legislative reforms and contracting terms
that have the potential for lessening negative impacts of toll road
privatizations, and evaluates states' use of these tools to date.
I. FREEWAYS, TOLL ROADS, AND ROAD PRIVATIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Though common abroad,' 9 privatizing toll roads has only
recently gained momentum in the United States. So far, twenty-
three states and Puerto Rico have passed laws to allow for road
'" See, e.g., FRANCK BOUSQUET, WORLD BANK, ANALYSIS OF HIGHWAY
CONCESSIONS IN EUROPE (1999), http://www.worldbank.org/transporttroads/trdocs/
hwy-conc.pdf; JOSE A. G6MEZ-IBA&EZ & JOHN R. MEYER, GOING PRIVATE: THE
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH TRANSPORT PRIVATIZATION 113-17, 123-28
(1993) (describing early road privatizations in France and Spain).
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privatization.2" Officials and legislatures in other states have
considered the option.21
The disastrous Minneapolis bridge collapse on August 1,
200722 brought to the nation's attention a problem that had been
growing for some time: Our nation's bridges and highways are
quite literally crumbling. Unfortunately, Minnesota is not alone.
An Oklahoma bridge forming part of Interstate 40 collapsed in
2002, killing fourteen people.23 The American Association of
State Highway Transportation Officials ("AASHTO") reports that
the average age of bridges nationwide is 43 years-most built
with a projected 50-year lifespan.24 As a result of the inevitable
deterioration of aging bridges, this year AASHTO rated
"structurally deficient" approximately 80,000 of the nation's
20 Jurisdictions with toll road privatization enabling statutes are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and the
territory of Puerto Rico. See the Federal Highway Administration's website for links
to each state's legislation. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., STATE PPP
LEGISLATION OVERVIEW TABLE (2007), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/toolsstate
legis table.htm. North Carolina repealed its road privatization statute in 2006. 2006
N.C. Sess. Laws 228.
21 Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell introduced enabling legislation after
accepting the Turnpike proposal in 2008; the legislation did not pass. H.B. 2593, 92d
Gen. Assem. (Pa. 2008). The governors of New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts
have also expressed interest in leasing the turnpikes of those states. Ken Belson,
Toll Road Offers New Jersey a Fiscal Test Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at A29;
Casey Ross, Deval Eyes Road to Lea$ing; More Tolls on Way if Private Companies
Take Over, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 11, 2007, at 7; see also Michael Gormley,
Following Other States, New York May Lease Assets, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 3,
2008, available at http://nl.newsbank.comlnl-search/we/Archives?p-action=list&
p-topdoc=21 (listing state highways among the assets "[u]nder consideration for
leasing" by New York Governor David Paterson). New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine
later withdrew his privatization plan and, instead, proposed solving his state's
budget problem with toll increases while leaving the turnpikes under state control.
Craig R. McCoy, Corzine Calls for 50% Toll Increase; It Would Begin in 2010 and
Aim to Cut State Debt, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 9, 2008, at Al. Alternate versions of
the plan are still under discussion. Joe Donohue, Lawmakers Consider Private Lanes
on N.J. Turnpike, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jul. 8, 2008, http://www.nj.com
/news/ledger/topstories/index.ssf/2008/07/lawmakers-consider-private lan.html.
22 Libby Sander & Susan Saulny, Bridge Failure in Minnesota Kills 7 People,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at Al.
2' Eric Kelderman, The State of the Union-Crumbling, STATE OF THE STATES
40, 41 (2008), available at http://www.stateline.org/live/publications/pdf-request.
24 AM. ASS'N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFICIALS, BRIDGING THE GAP:
RESTORING AND REBUILDING THE NATION'S BRIDGES 2 (2008) [hereinafter AASHTO




590,000 bridges.25 Pennsylvania offers a particularly serious
case: In 2005, a fifty-foot, 125-ton section of an overpass
collapsed onto Interstate 70 in western Pennsylvania, forcing
officials to seal off the highway and raze the bridge.26 And in
March 2008, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
abruptly closed a section of Interstate 95, a major artery carrying
190,000 cars a day into and out of Philadelphia, to perform
emergency repairs to a steel-reinforced concrete column
displaying a crack "[four] feet long and several inches wide."27 In
Massachusetts, where over fifty percent of the bridges are rated
"structurally deficient,"28 residents also have to be concerned
about tunnels. In 2006, they learned that the Sumner and
Callahan Tunnels, the two major routes from Boston's Logan
Airport into the city, had flaws including a badly deteriorated
concrete liner atop one of the tunnels.2 9
In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the first
Federal Highway Act, launching the Federal Interstate Highway
System, an ambitious network of free roads designed to connect
the growing nation.3 0  These highways would come to shape
patterns of development, means of travel, and channels of
commerce throughout the country for generations to come. The
massive project cost an estimated $128.9 billion, ninety percent
of that funded directly by the federal government. 1 President
Eisenhower's highways followed in the tradition of Franklin
Roosevelt's vast public works projects built during the New Deal,
which included public buildings, bridges, roads, airports, schools,
hospitals, national parks, sewage treatment plans, viaducts, and
dams, most notably the Hoover Dam.32
25 Id. at 18.
26 Michael Hasch, Beam Collapse onto 1-70 Hurts 2, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
Dec. 28, 2005.
27 Edward Colimore, PennDot Closes a Section of 1-9: Emergency Repairs May
Keep It Closed for Days, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 18, 2008, at Al.
28 See AASHTO REPORT, supra note 24, at 19.
29 Long Road Ahead To Repair Tunnels, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 26, 2006, at 18.
20 Richard F. Weingroff, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Creating the
Interstate System, PUBLIC ROADS (Summer 1996), available at http://www.tflrc.gov/
pubrds/summer96p96su10.htm.
-1 50th Anniversary of the Interstate Highway System-Frequently Asked
Questions, http:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
32 Adam Cohen, Public Works: When 'Big Government' Plays Its Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A28.
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Today, as the expected useful life of much of the Interstate
Highway System approaches expiration, a new set of economic
pressures and political assumptions will shape how we address
the challenge. State budgets are strained, and the federal deficit
is greater than at any prior point in history.3 The primary
sources of highway funding, federal and state motor fuel taxes,34
are not keeping up with the costs of maintaining roads 5 The
federal gas tax, for example, is set at a flat, per-gallon rate not
indexed to inflation and has not been raised since 1993, despite
the soaring costs of highway construction. 6 Yet raising the tax is
a politically unpopular move few care to risk. In fact, in the face
of rising gas prices, presidential candidates even proposed
eliminating the federal gas tax for the summer of 2008,"7 despite
simultaneously acknowledging a nationwide need for massive
road and infrastructure improvements.3 Additionally, it may no
longer be wise policy for the government to foot the bill for a road
project of such scope, given the consequences of the fuel-
intensive, car-centric culture that resulted from the success of
the Interstate Highway System.
For several of these reasons, the federal government has
gradually expanded the extent to which states may use toll
roads, and more recently, toll roads operated by private
companies, to meet transportation needs. In the initial decades
following the Federal Highway Act, federal law prohibited states
from imposing tolls on federal-aid highways other than limited
3 Robert Pear & David M. Merzenhorn, White House Predicts Bush Will Leave
$482 Billion Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2008, at C1.
34 BENJAMIN PEREZ & STEVE LOCKWOOD, PB CONSULT, CURRENT TOLL ROAD
ACTIVITY IN THE U.S.: A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 19 (2009), http://www.fhwa.
dot.gov/ppp/pdf/2008-toll-activity-whitepaper.pdf (showing how federal, state, and
local motor-fuel taxes accounted for $85 billion in revenues used for highways in
2006, by far the largest portion of the total of $165 billion).
35 See AASHTO REPORT, supra note 24, at 6, 12-13.
36 John M. Broder, Democrats Divided Over Gas Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2008, at Al.
31 S. 2890, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008); S. 2971, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008) ("gas tax
holiday" legislation sponsored by Senators McCain and Clinton, respectively).
' David J. Lynch, Clinton's Goals for Economy? Big Change; U.S. Needs To Pick
Its Priorities, She Says, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2008, at lB. As Americans become
conscious of fuel economy and use less gas, fuel-tax revenue-which is based on the
gallon, not the dollar, of gas consumed-may actually decline. Nicholas J. Farber,
Note, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Public Private Partnerships: Issues To Be Aware of
When Transferring Transportation Assets, 35 TRANSP. L.J. 25, 29 (2008).
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high-cost projects like bridges and tunnels. 9 However, starting
with a pilot program in 1987, states may now establish publicly
operated toll roads on federal-aid highways that are not part of
the Interstate Highway System.4 ° In 1991, the law expanded the
program to all states and also began to encourage private
investment, permitting the combination of private and federal
funds. 41 Although a pilot program since allowed construction of
new toll highways on the Interstate Highway System itself,42 that
practice was again prohibited in 2007.43
More than half of the states have moved to take advantage of
the changes, launching 235 state-operated toll road projects
between 1992 and 2009.4' Thus far, toll revenues have been used
more to create new roads or lanes than to repair existing ones.4
California began its experiments with road privatization in 1993
when it accepted a private toll road operator's proposal to
construct and lease dedicated lanes of an already-existing Los
Angeles area freeway.4" In keeping with the project's stated goal
of relieving traffic congestion, the new lanes were to be free to
cars with three or more occupants and otherwise tolled at rates
that increased during times of peak usage.47 The lease was for
thirty years; however, due to a dispute arising out of a
non-competition clause that prevented the state from developing
or expanding nearby roads, California bought back the lease in
2002.48
States started entering into wholesale leases of entire
roadways only in 2004 with the privatization of the Chicago
Tollway, a ninety-nine-year concession to operate a busy
39 23 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Pub. L. 85-767 (1958).
40 23 U.S.C. § 129(a) (2000); Pub. L. 100-17 § 120 (1987).
"' 23 U.S.C. § 129(a); Pub. L. 102-240 § 1012(a) (1991).
42 Pub. L. 105-178 § 1216(b), 112 Stat. 107, 212-14 (1998). Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-
59, § 1604(c), 119 Stat. 1144, 1253-54 (2005).
43 Pub. L. 110-60, 2007 H.R. 2674, § 197.
4 PEREZ & LOCKWOOD, supra note 34, at 1.
45 Id. at 2.
46 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 36.
47 Id.
48 Id.; Daniel Yi & Jack Leonard, O.C. Set To Buy Tollway Along 9: Transit
Agency Agrees To Pay the Private Operator $207 Million for the Express Lanes, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, Part 2, at 1.
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7.8-mile connector highway in exchange for $1.8 billion.49 Two
years later, Indiana entered into the largest toll road concession
to date.50 The day after Indiana signed its agreement, Virginia
leased its 8.8-mile Pocahontas Highway to an Australian
investment consortium for ninety-nine years.5 In 2007, another
such concession was signed for a roadway near Denver,
Colorado.52  In 2008, Pennsylvania considered and ultimately
rejected a $12.6 billion lease for its Turnpike.53 Florida and
Mississippi are at various stages of the bidding and leasing
process for their own toll road deals.54
Texas has had a more complicated experience. The Texas
legislature gave its approval for Governor Perry's Trans-Texas
Corridor Project in 2003, starting a round of negotiations which
has so far resulted in several development agreements but only
one active toll road concession agreement. In the face of rising
opposition, the Texas legislature issued a moratorium on new
privatization projects and commissioned a study to determine the
benefits and disadvantages of privatization.1
6
49 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CASE STUDY: CHICAGO
SKYWAY, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/case-studies-chicago.htm.
50 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CASE STUDY: INDIANA
TOLL ROAD, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/case-studies-indianatoll.htm.
11 Jerome R. Corsi, U.S. Parkway Leased to Aussie Firm: Opponents See Tie to
Feds' Sell-Off of Infrastructure to Foreigners, WORLD NET DAILY, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE-ID=53825.
52 Jeffrey Leib, Lease Signed for NW Parkway, DENVER POST, Nov. 20, 2007, at
B1; Nw. Parkway LLC, About Us, http://www.northwestparkway.org/aboutus.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
- See Nussbaum, supra note 12.
" Airport Parkway Home Page, http://www.theairportparkway.com/Home.aspx
(last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (providing links to Mississippi bid documents); see
also Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Transp. (Aug. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.alligator-alley.comDocuments/PPP%20AA%20RFP%2OAug%2026%2020
08%20_2_.pdf (announcing Florida bid).
55 TEX. TRANsP. CODE ANN. §§ 223.010-223.2b (Vernon 2008) (enabling
legislation); see also Tex. Dep't of Transp., Comprehensive Development
Agreements, http://www.txdot.gov/business/partnerships/cda.htm (last visited Jan.
27, 2009) (providing links to existing development agreements); http://www.
txdot.gov/business/partnerships/sh-130.htm (providing links to existing concession
agreements and exhibits).
' TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 223.210 (Vernon 2008).
[Vol. 83:351360
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
II. PRIVATIZATION: BACKGROUND AND DEBATE
A. The Trend Towards Privatization
The modern movement towards privatization began in the
mid-1970s and has continued to grow since." Privatization
refers to any of variety of processes that transfer government
functions and responsibilities in whole or in part to the
private sector.58 For example, deregulating formerly regulated
industries, transferring assets by lease or sale of income-
producing government assets, contracting out government
services, and using voucher programs to allow citizens to
purchase housing or education from the private market are all
forms of privatization.59 In the United States, the most common
form of privatization is contracting out. While government
agencies have long contracted to procure goods or services that
the government will use, privatization differs from ordinary
procurement in that the subject of the contract is a service that
had previously been performed by the government itself. The
array of privatized services is vast. A municipality might
contract out its trash collection, its parks maintenance, or its
information technology services. A state might privatize its
welfare program or hire private companies to operate some of its
prisons.60  Federal government agencies working overseas,
including the Department of Defense, hire private contractors to
feed troops, to train and arm foreign military forces, to
interrogate suspected terrorists, or to provide security for U.S.
6, E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 15 (2000).
58 See Carol M. Rose, Privatization-The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 691, 691 (2006) (stating that privatization "generally refers to governmentally
sponsored efforts to move assets and economic decision-making away from the
political arena and into the hands of individuals or private corporations").
"' See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD 34-35 (2002); Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1520-21 (2001) (describing divestiture of government
assets and government enterprises as a form of privatization). Throughout this
article, I use the word "public" to refer to both free roads and toll roads owned and
managed by government agencies or authorities, financed through traditionally
governmental means including taxation and bond financing, and the word "private"
to refer to toll roads financed, leased, and managed by private, for-profit
corporations. The terms are used thus for convenience, though imagining a universal
and rigid dichotomy between government as "public" and for-profit industry as
"private" would be misleading in many other contexts.
6 See Diller, supra note 16, at 1751-57; Pozen, supra note 16, at 253-54.
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personnel.6 These and other forms of privatization have become
common. Contractual arrangements in which the government
hires a private entity to implement a program or provide
a good or service to the public while retaining some
ownership or role in the endeavor are known as Public-Private
Partnerships ("PPPs").62 The phrase suggests shared benefits
and responsibilities and is preferred by privatization proponents;
one author has noted that "public-private partnership" also
raises less controversy than the word "privatization."63
Nevertheless, PPPs are one form of privatization.64
Governments are increasingly also turning to private
industry to design, build, manage and operate infrastructure.
Several models exist for these arrangements. Under one model,
the private company designs and builds the asset and then turns
it over to the government entity for operation.65  These
"design-build" contracts resemble procurement contracts more
than service contracts in that the private company does not bear
any responsibility for providing an ongoing service to the public.
Conversely, a lease or concession agreement for an existing
infrastructure asset, or a "design-build-finance-operate" contract
for a new facility, turns over to a private company the
management or operation of an infrastructure asset, typically for
terms of ten years or more.66 These may provide for the private
company to be paid directly by the users of the service, through
user fees or charges.6" Municipal water systems and wastewater
treatment are increasingly provided by private entities through
61 See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 385, 390-91.
62 See Minow, supra note 16, at 1236.
63 SAVAS, supra note 57, at 3-4.
A Id.
65 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., DESIGN-BUILD EFFECTIVENESS
STUDY (2006), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/designbuild/designbuild.
pdf [hereinafter DESIGN-BUILD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY].
66 See Douglas Herbst & David Seader, Providing Public Services Through
Long-Term Service Agreements, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT INNOVATION 105, 113 (Robin
A. Johnson & Norman Walzer eds., 2000) (indicating a typical range of ten to twenty
years for municipal water supply contracts); see also id. at 106-12 (providing a
history of PPP use in water and wastewater management); SAVAS, supra note 57, at
241-47 (describing a spectrum of PPP arrangements used in infrastructure
contracts).
67 See SAVAS, supra note 57, at 88-89 (providing a chart depicting Savas'
taxonomy of ten different arrangements for the provision of goods and services, from
wholly public to wholly private, including various types of PPPs).
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arrangements like these.68 More recently, some U.S. cities have
leased or plan to lease their airports under agreements similar to
toll road privatizations.69
Toll road privatizations emerge as a curious hybrid between
asset transfers and service contracts. They resemble service
contracts in that the company agrees to provide a specified
service to the contract, and in that states typically retain
ownership of the asset as well as a good deal of oversight and
control of the service to be provided. One marked difference
between toll road privatizations and other service contracts, and
even other infrastructure privatizations, is the length of the lease
terms. At up to ninety-nine years, the highway lease terms
represent a full monetization of the asset-as would the sale or
long-term lease of an asset over which the government no longer
chose to exercise control.70
B. Rationales for Privatization
A political sentiment that government has expanded too
much, and would better be confined to a more limited role, has
been a large part of the driving force behind the modern
privatization trend.71 This represents a major perceptual shift
from recent generations. Government agencies are now seen as
inefficient, unresponsive, and rife with opportunities for fraud,
abuse, and failure of oversight.7 ' Legislatures, in turn, are
viewed as beholden to special interests and out of touch with the
public good. Even cultural markers of our time indicate this
shift. The men and women we once called "public servants" we
are more likely to label "bureaucrats." Government buildings
have also undergone a devolution during this time, from the
'8 See Herbst & Seader, supra note 66, at 107-14; Arnold, supra note 16, at 569.
6' Casey Andrew Burton, Comment, An Analysis of the Proposed Privatization of
Chicago's Midway Airport, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 597, 597-98, 600-01 (2007).
70 NW FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, THE CHICAGO SKYWAY SALE: AN ANALYTICAL
REVIEW 1 (2006) [hereinafter CHICAGO SKYWAY SALE], available at http://www.
nwfinancial.com/pdf/thechicagosalereport.pdf. An example of an asset transfer
accomplished by long-term lease would be a mineral lease.
" Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV.
449, 451-52 (1988).
72 See, e.g., Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive
Possibilities of the New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV 1001, 1005 (1995)
(describing public schools in such terms); Freeman, supra note 87, at 1317
(indicating that government agency oversight is often ineffective).
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gleaming marble edifices of the mid-twentieth century to the
uninspiring utilitarian boxes of today.73
In contrast, during this same period, business and
entrepreneurship have enjoyed an upswing in esteem, with
confidence shifting from the government to the markets. In this
light, governments are further distrusted for having a monopoly
on the goods and services they provide, and thus, having no
incentive to improve quality.74  As for any concerns about
democratic accountability, privatization advocates assure us that
the market democratizes itself as consumers and shareholders
"vote with their feet," or their dollars, to promote quality goods
and services.75
This broad political shift shapes the assumptions underlying
the specific justifications for allowing private business to take
over some government functions. An oft-cited reason for
privatization is efficiency. By privatizing a service, government
can take advantage of efficiency gains that come with private
business, such as management structures, specialized expertise,
and innovation. Private for-profit companies, the reasoning goes,
have an incentive to invest in cost-saving improvements and to
eliminate wasteful spending-the government does not. A
private company may also have the ability to attract investment,
which is especially important in areas like infrastructure, which
require large up-front infusions of cash. In tough economic
times, an infrastructure privatization can simultaneously provide
a funding source for a needed upgrade and an infusion of
additional revenue to the government. Finally, privatization
might allow government to allocate some financial and political
risks to the private sector.76
C. Best Cases for Privatization
As privatization has become accepted, a rough consensus has
emerged about the kinds of government functions best suited for
7' Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and
Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 127 (2005).
71 SAVAS, supra note 57, at 122-24.
75 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in
Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1493-94 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(describing this phenomenon as a justification for airline deregulation).
76 SAVAS, supra note 57, at 252-54 (citing the ability to relieve government of
involvement in rate-setting as a beneficial reallocation of a political risk).
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privatization. The best candidates are those services which
stand to gain from the advantages of private business without
running aground on problems that arise from conflicting goals or
from failures in accountability.
Services most likely to reap private sector advantages are
those for which the private sector has greater expertise than the
public sector, particularly those with existing competition within
the private sector.77 In transportation, design-build contracts
offer a good example of this. Various engineering and
construction teams compete with each other in bidding to design
and build infrastructure projects, bringing the benefits of
engineering expertise, industry knowledge, and the ability to
mobilize construction teams as necessary to complete projects in
a timely manner. Design-build contracts have therefore become
common in new highway construction.7" In addition, areas with a
potential for increased efficiency or value through innovation are
good cases for privatization. An example for this may be
information technology services such as software or website
development. Finally, projects that need an up-front investment
of capital-raised more easily by private investment-and
projects that are subject to risks that the private sector is best
able to bear, are good cases for privatization.7 9
Government programs and services least likely to run into
the accountability problems this Article has outlined are those
services that are the easiest to define with specificity and that do
not entail much discretion on the part of the contracting party. 0
Where the goals of a program are not contentious and the
contractor is performing a task with no policymaking discretion,
the need for public input into the contracting process lessens.
More problematic candidates for privatization are government
functions that have serious potential to implicate individual
77 See JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF
PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 86-87 (1996).
71 DESIGN-BUILD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 63, at i-ii (stating that,
between 1990 and 2002, 300 projects in 32 states were proposed for design-build
contracting, and of those 140 projects were completed).
" SAvAS, supra note 57, at 252-54.
so Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization: From
Public Law to Publicization, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 83, 105 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (discussing tasks of various
degrees of specificity).
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rights,"1 particularly if one of the government's reasons for the
privatization effort is a desire to evade legal accountability
mechanisms now in place.82 Finally, privatizing government
services works best where there is a credible threat of
replacement for the contracting party; otherwise, privatization
may carry with it a danger of entrenchment.8 3 Entrenchment
brings risks of poor service or the possibility of overcharging the
government or the users.8 4
D. Potential Hazards of Privatization
1. The Problems of Conflicting Goals
The first concern raised by any privatization effort is the
potentially conflicting goals of the public and private sectors.
Privatization proceeds under the assumption that the
participants already agree what the proper goals are, and that
the only debate is about finding the best, or the most economical,
means to achieve them.85 For some services, agreement on goals
is relatively easy: The goal of municipal trash collection is to
pick up the trash at regular intervals. However, it is often
difficult to reach agreement about the underlying goals of a
government program. For example, the mass privatization of
welfare programs in the "welfare-to-work" transition of the 1990s
was hailed as a success from the point of view of reducing the
number of people on the welfare rolls, but may have been less
successful at the goal of bringing mothers and children out of
poverty. 6
Tensions can also arise from conflicts between the public
goals of a program and the profit-oriented goals of the private
81 Private prisons have been criticized on these grounds, though the availability
of judicial recourse for prisoners has somewhat served to allay these concerns. See,
e.g., Aman, supra note 75, at 1489-91; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1393-94 (2003); Pozen, supra note 16, at 276-
81.
82 Freeman, supra note 80, at 108-09.
1 HANDLER, supra note 77, at 85.
84 "[Tlhe choice between profit seekers and civil servants depends on
whether... contractors can be replaced ..." Id.
85 Cass, supra note 69, at 452.
8 Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion,
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (2000).
[Vol. 83:351366
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
entity running it.87  As private companies strive to achieve the
cost savings that are often the goal of any privatization, the
profit motive may create incentives for the private company to
achieve those costs savings at the expense of quality or amount of
services to be provided. The profit motive might also lead
companies to overcharge the government for services, or to
charge excessive user fees. 88 At worst, lack of transparency may
provide opportunities for poor quality, inefficiency, fraud, or
graft.8 9 Commentators have pointed to such abuses in a wide
range of privatizations such as military support services,
Medicare, municipal water services, and parks management.9"
2. Challenges to Democratic Accountability
The second major set of concerns arising out of privatizations
is the potential to undermine essential public law values of
democratic participation and accountability when activities
migrate from the public to the private sphere. 91 A core value in
any democratic form of government is the participation of the
governed in the act of governing. Accountability, in turn, stands
for the degree to which the policies and activities of governance
are subject to monitoring through the political process.92 Citizens
" Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1339 (2003); Metzger, supra note 81, at 1408; Minow, supra
note 16, at 1248-49.
' See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1282-83 (2003) (explaining how profit motive can conflict with
public motive); see Arnold, supra note 16, at 584-85 (describing private water
companies' opportunities to exploit monopoly position by charging excessive rates).
' Dannin, supra note 73, at 136 ("[W]hen temptations to shirk or defraud exist,
we need a binding web of laws to ensure accountability.").
90 E.g., Ellen Dannin, To Market, to Market: Legislating on Privatization and
Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 252 (2001) (detailing how a contractor hired to
operate California state parks reservation system absconded with nearly $1 million);
id. at 253 (detailing the corruption and waste in California Department of
Transportation engineering contracts); id. at 254 (detailing how a company
managing a municipal water system in Georgia falsified water quality records); see,
e.g., GOMEZ-IBANEZ & MEYER, supra note 19, at 70 (citing an example of reduced-
quality bus services due to use of lower-paid, and lower-skilled, drivers); see also
Dickinson, supra note 16, at 399 (citing examples of inefficiency, fraud, and graft in
military support services in Iraq). See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001) (citing
abuses in the administration of welfare-to-work programs).
"' For the purpose of this article's analysis, I accept as normative values these
ideals of democracy and accountability. See infra Part IV.C.
92 Beermann, supra note 59, at 1507.
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should have access to enough information about the
government's actions to hold elected officials responsible for their
consequences. Thus, both "pre-decision accountability" in the
form of participation and "post-decision accountability" in the
form of monitoring are key democratic values.
Recently, many scholars have described challenges to these
democratic values that emerge as governments increasingly
partner with the private sector to provide public services. 94 For
democratic participation to take place prior to a major
governmental decision, affected citizens need access to
information about the decision and a means for registering their
comments. Therefore, one concern about privatizations is a lack
of opportunity for the public to obtain information regarding
proposals and to comment on them prior to their enactment, even
when the program shift has the potential for broad impacts. The
procurement rules that apply to government purchases have
been designed to guard against fraud and graft, but they neither
anticipate the need for nor allow public input into the policy
decisions implicated.95  Because privatization of government
services differs from ordinary procurement, the existing laws are
not a good fit.
Another concern is that lack of access to information
hampers public monitoring, diminishing post-decision
transparency that would allow citizens to assess the quality of
the privatized service and to hold agencies and officials
accountable after the fact. Where a government entity contracts
out a function, laws designed to increase governmental
transparency and accountability, including the Freedom of
Information Act and most corresponding state open records acts,
generally do not apply to the private entities.96
93 I borrow these terms from Ellen Dannin. See Dannin, supra note 73, at 130.
94 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 16; Beerman, supra note 59, at 1520 ("[O]nce an
asset becomes private, its use is likely to be subject to less government supervision
than when it was under public ownership, so an accountability issue does exist."); see
also Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559 (2001).
95 Bezdek, supra note 94, at 1569-70.
- 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(j)-(l) (West 2007); Aman, supra note 75, at 1501; Bezdek,
supra note 94, at 1560, 1569-70; Beermann, supra note 59, at 1553-54; Craig D.
Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public
Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 37-43 (1999).
Though some state open records laws have been extended to some private actors,
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III. THE CASE OF PRIVATIZED TOLL ROADS: BENEFITS AND
DRAWBACKS
States have three basic options for providing and
maintaining roadways: publicly operated roads, free to users and
paid for by taxes; publicly operated toll roads, typically financed
with bonds repaid through user fees in the form of tolls; and
privately financed and operated toll roads.97 At this point, the
vast majority of U.S. highways are publicly-financed roads, free
to the public.98 A growing minority of roads are toll roads, most
of those operated by public authorities. 99 As states consider the
relative newcomer, privatized toll roads, they should do so with
an eye to both the potential advantages to be gained and hazards
to be avoided. Keeping these considerations in view will help
states make the best decision between the options that are
available.
Many aspects of the operation of a road make it appear
exactly the sort of task ideally suited to private contracting: The
risk of some potential hazards is low, and some potential benefits
are evident. The quality of the road, the level of maintenance,
and other similar terms can be determined and agreed to in
advance with great levels of specificity by contract, which
eliminates much of the risk of poor quality that can happen in
the privatization of less-concrete services. Similarly, the
privatization of toll roads does not bear much risk of serious
this is the exception rather than the rule. Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine"
Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in
Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REV. 623, 641-42 (2007); see
also id. at 641-46 (discussing the applicability of state open meetings acts to public-
private partnerships).
" States may also consider improvements to cycling infrastructure or turn to
rail and other forms of public transportation to meet a portion of their mobility
needs.
98 In 2006, there were 4,033,012 miles of federal-aid highways in the United
States. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY
LENGTH (2006), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/pdf/hml4.pdf. In contrast,
as of 2007, there were just 2,908 miles of toll roads on the Interstate System and
1,938 miles of non-Interstate toll roads. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., TOLL MILEAGE TRENDS: 2007 TOLL FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tollpage/miletrends.htm#table2.
" See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY
LENGTH (2006), available at httpJ/www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohimlhs06/pdf'hml4.pdf;
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., TOLL MILEAGE TRENDS: 2007 TOLL
FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov
/ohimltollpage/miletrends.htm#table2.
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infringement of personal rights, because toll road operators will
not have direct control over the lives of vulnerable individuals, as
do prison operators and Medicare providers.
In addition, the potential for certain advantages is high.
States can benefit from innovations offered by private operators.
The companies bidding on these contracts have enormously more
experience operating toll roads than do state governments.
Large multinational corporations building toll roads around the
world can offer the latest innovations in safety systems and toll-
collection technology, can achieve economies of scale by using
these technologies for more than one project, and can leverage
funds to finance up front large-scale projects that state
governments would otherwise pay for over a period of many
years.
A. Tensions Inherent in Conflicting Goals
Toll road privatizations, however, also raise conflicts
between the various state goals and the goals of the toll road
concessionaire-conflicts that can ultimately undermine state
goals and potentially harm the public. From a state
government's point of view, the primary reason for leasing a toll
road is financial. States seeking ways to fund repairs and
upgrades to transportation infrastructure see a welcome solution
in the concessionaire's promise to maintain the toll road and its
upfront payment of cash to fund other transportation needs.
Beyond that, state toll road enabling laws present an array of
reasons for the practice. Congestion relief is often cited,100 along
with goals related to efficiency, 1' safety, 10 2  economic
development, 10 3 and expedited delivery of completed roadways.0 4
No statute offers a more sweeping range of reasons for
privatization than the Pennsylvania bill proposed in 2008, which
added to these goals promises of "abating environmental
pollution, advancing energy efficiency and conservation,
100 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2001(d)(3) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-
558(A)(1) (2008).
101 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2001(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-558(A)(1).
102 See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 334.30 (2008); VA. CODE ANN, § 56-558(A)(1).
103 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:2072(A) (2008) (describing transportation as
essential to Louisiana's "economic growth"); OR. REV. STAT. § 383.001(1) (2008)
(describing transportation as essential to the "economic well-being" of the people of
Oregon).
104 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:2072(C); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-558(A)(3).
[Vol. 83:351
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
improving homeland security, increasing capacity ... and
[raising] revenues available for public transportation
purposes." °5
However, several of the asserted goals of road privatization
may be in conflict with each other, and with the private
operator's profit motive. The chief point of tension between
public and private ends lies in the potential for excessive user
fees in the form of tolls, which can rise substantially under a
lease or concession. An examination of such toll-cap provisions in
existing toll road concession agreements led the U.S.
Government Accountability Office to conclude that "the public
could pay higher tolls than those that would more appropriately
reflect the true costs of ... maintaining the facilities, including
earning a reasonable rate of return."106
The Chicago Tollway concession agreement provides the
initial model.0 7 The agreement sets forth a specific schedule for
toll increases over the first ten years of the lease, then allows
annual increases equal to the greater of two percent, the percent
increase in per capita gross domestic product ("GDP"), or the
percentage increase in the consumer price index."0 ' Future toll
caps are therefore uncertain, since no one can predict what the
GDP will be over the next ninety-nine years; in fact, the
Government Accountability Office's own figures only project GDP
for forty years. 09 However, GDP has historically risen much
more sharply than wages. ° If a similar pricing scheme had been
applied to the Pennsylvania Turnpike from 1940 to 2007, the
cross-state toll would have risen to $553, instead of the actual
rate of $22.75."' Therefore, the steadily increasing caps on
prices, over time, will likely leave ample room for the toll road
company to set rates at whatever the market will bear.
Inextricably tied to toll setting are the other dominant goals
of mobility improvement and congestion relief. Toll roads
operate according to the basic laws of supply and demand: As
the price increases, fewer users use the roads. A California
1o5 H.B. 2593, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2008).
106 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 32.
107 See id. at 31.
108 See id. at 31-32.
o See id. at 3 1.
10 Farber, supra note 38, at 36.
111 See id.
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concession used a strategy called "congestion pricing," whereby
travelers paid more to use the roads at high-demand times than
during off-peak hours.112  Because a smaller segment of the
population could reasonably afford to pay the tolls, the new lanes
led to charges of elitism and prompted detractors to refer to them
as "Lexus lanes." 3
Beyond the charges of elitism, however, are even greater
public concerns about how the sorting effect of tolling will affect
overall regional traffic patterns. The ideal price from the point of
view of a toll road operator may not be the same as the ideal
price for regional congestion management." 4 Typically, if a
private toll road concessionaire can achieve greater revenues
from fewer users at a higher price than they can from more users
at a lower price point, it will act in accordance with this economic
incentive. To illustrate the point, imagine that, when a segment
of road is priced at one dollar, the number of cars using that
route during a particular hour will be 5,000, generating $5,000 of
revenue. If that same road will still attract 3,000 users when the
toll is tripled to three dollars, bringing in $9,000 during that
same hour, then an operator with the ability to charge the higher
toll has every incentive to do so, regardless of what level of usage
represents the optimal use of the road. While a high-priced toll
lane might provide a speedy commute for the driver willing and
able to pay for it, as the price goes up, other drivers will divert to
local routes. Therefore, concession agreements that give
operators wide latitude for toll setting within a potentially
generous cap may result in less than optimal use of the roads, as
drivers unable or unwilling to pay the increased fees will clog
surrounding roads.' The externalities associated with this shift
affect local communities, not just the potential toll road users.
More crowded local routes increase vehicle emissions pollution
caused by cars idling in traffic, and could also diminish rather
than enhance overall road safety as a greater proportion of
112 Alan Sipress, Paying for Space in the Fast Lane: Md. Plan Targets
Congestion, WASH. POST, May 18, 1999, at AO1.
11 Amy Argetsinger & Steven Ginsberg, Lessons of California's Toll Lanes:
Appeal and Hazards Offer Glimpse of Va. Beltway To Come, WASH. POST, June 20,
2005, at A01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
115 See Ellen M. Erhardt, Note, Caution Ahead: Changing Laws To




accidents take place on non-access-controlled roads. In short, an
inflated toll structure has the potential to undermine several of
the major goals that states have identified as reasons to pursue
road privatization efforts in the first place.
Another related potential source of conflict between a state
and a toll road operator arises from the operator's desire to limit
competition with the toll road. A private company naturally
wants to see a return on its large up front investment, and does
not want to see its project underused due to competition from
improved free roads. 16 Therefore, concessionaires typically ask
state transportation departments to agree not to widen or
construct roadways within a certain distance of the toll road." 7
The cautionary tale of highway non-competition clauses arose
from the Riverside Freeway (SR-91) in California. There, the
state agreed to allow a private company to lease the median of
this Southern California freeway in order to build four tolled
lanes, two in each direction.11 The project was innovative in that
the lanes functioned both as high-occupancy vehicle lanes ("HOV
lanes"), allowing passenger cars with three or more occupants to
pass through toll-free, and as an experiment in congestion
pricing, with greater tolls at high-use times. 1 9 The lease also
restricted the state's right to expand or improve the adjacent
lanes, which led to a lawsuit under which the concession
company sued the State of California for making improvements
prohibited by the contract.120 The issue was resolved only when
the state ended the concession agreement prematurely, paying
116 Non-competition clauses for toll roads are not new; they have typically been
included as a prerequisite to public financing as well. The Interstate System
Construction Toll Pilot Program prohibits non-competition agreements in PPPs only
on toll roads that form part of the Interstate System. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119
Stat. 1144, 1253 (2005).
117 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36.
11 See Glen Creno, New Transit Plan May Call for New Sources of Funding,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 2007, at 19; Scott Powers, Tolls Can Ease 1-4 Woes-at a
Price: Some Support the Idea, but Critics Said Pay Lanes on Freeways Only Benefit
Rich Drivers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 2003, at B1.
119 See Carl B. Williams, Are HOV Lanes Alone Effective?, ENGINEERING NEWS-
REC., Sept. 23, 1996, at 111.
120 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36; David Danelski, Highway 91 Toll
Lanes Go Public: COMMUTING: Officials Are Still Unsure Whether the Ownership
Change Will Reduce Fares for Drivers, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Jan. 4, 2003, at BO.
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the company $207.5 million to buy back the lease only eight
years into its planned thirty-year term. 121
The extraordinary length of toll road leases only enhances
potential tensions between toll levels and traffic mitigation goals.
The long terms of the agreements arise in part from the economic
benefit that the toll road company gets by claiming accelerated
depreciation for tax purposes. 122 In order for the concessionaire
to qualify as an owner eligible to deduct depreciation, the lease
term must exceed the useful life of the asset.123  Of course,
concessionaires also want long leases for another reason as well:
Longer leases provide a longer future income stream to the
concessionaire. The state's own budget pressures may also cause
governors and transportation departments to favor longer terms,
because toll road operators can offer a higher up-front price,
allowing the state to count on more years of income. Therefore,
long lease terms have become an essential part of the financial
structure of any toll road privatization deal.
However, each decade these agreements extend into the
future multiplies the uncertainties about the extent of toll
increases and the changing transportation needs of the state,
therefore increasing the likelihood of conflict between the public
goals of the program and the profit motive of the company.
Continuing to allow long lease terms without building in any
protective mechanisms runs the risk of deal terms that will place
an unacceptable burden on future generations.
B. How Privatized Toll Roads Challenge Democratic Values
This section will examine the harms to the core values of
democracy and accountability that can occur, and in some cases,
have occurred, in the privatization of toll roads.
121 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36; Danelski, supra note 118.
122 Memorandum from the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit Staff to the
Members of the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, Hearing on Public-Private
Partnerships: Innovative Financing and Protecting the Public Interest 7 (Feb. 12,
2007), available at http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Highways/20070213/
ssm.pdf.
123 See 26 U.S.C.A § 168(g)(5) (2008); Memorandum from the Subcomm. on
Highways and Transit Staff to the Members of the Subcomm. on Highways and
Transit, Hearing on Public-Private Partnerships: Innovative Financing and
Protecting the Public Interest 7 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/FilefHighways/20070213/ssm.pdf; see also




For democracy to function in any society, institutions and
practices must be in place to "support democratic engagement
and participation by individuals and groups in the tasks of self-
government. 124 Citizens cannot be mere recipients or purchasers
of government services; they must also participate in the act of
governance itself.'25 When toll roads are privatized, there are
few opportunities for interested citizens to voice their preferences
during the process leading to the initial lease decision.
Individuals do, in a sense, "purchase" the opportunity to drive on
the roadway through the payment of user fees in the form of
tolls. The shift from a participatory role to a consumer role
changes the role of individuals vis-A-vis their government from
one of citizens to one of consumers. This itself erodes the ideals
of a democratic society.12
6
Certainly not all government actions provide equal
opportunity for participation. For example, the disposition of
government assets is generally presumed to have little impact on
the public and takes place free from many of the procedural
constraints that govern other agency actions. 27  Nevertheless,
toll road leases involve more than a series of financial
transactions with drivers or the disposition by lease of a
government asset. Toll road operators also become responsible
for providing an essential governmental service that will affect
the greater community, with impacts on commerce, the
environment, and the state budget that will be felt for
generations to come. The privatization decision itself is a
significant act of governance that should be made in a way that
supports democratic values. When a government agency
considers pursuing a major privatization effort, affected parties
should have meaningful access to information about the proposal
and the opportunity to voice their opinion. 28 In the case of toll
124 MINOW, supra note 59, at 46.
121 Dannin, supra note 73, at 157.
126 See Aman, supra note 75, at 1504; see also Dannin, supra note 90, at 263.
127 See Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental
Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999). The authors argue for procedural protections even
in asset disposition. See id.
128 See Beermann, supra note 59, at 1509; Dannin, supra note 73, at 121-22;
Minow, supra note 16, at 1248-50.
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roads, this would include the ability of the public to review facts
about privatization proposals, bids, and contracts. 129
Those affected by toll roads include, of course, the roads'
potential users. They also include residents of communities near
the route who may have concerns about traffic or environmental
problems arising from cars using local roads to avoid tolls and
local jurisdictions whose own development plans will be affected
by any new road or changes in road access points or usage. State
officials and legislative committees responsible for transportation
planning and fiscal oversight also have an interest in toll road
privatizations. All of these potential stakeholders should have
an opportunity to examine and consider any preliminary plan
before the proposal is put out to bid. If a proposal arises out of an
unsolicited bid, then the key terms of that proposal should be
subject to examination and review before the proposal is put out
for competing bids. The process should also include mechanisms
for public comment and for the agency to respond to these
comments, and should require some analysis of competing
proposals that have been offered.
It is crucial that notice and comment come early in the
decision-making process. In Texas, the state had already
substantially negotiated several deals prior to holding hearings
required by the state's road privatization statute.13 ° Those public
hearings mobilized huge opposition to Trans-Texas Corridor
projects, particularly in rural areas,"' immediately positioning
the state government and its rural citizens as opponents instead
of as partners in governing. Meanwhile, the Texas Department
of Transportation ("TxDOT") released a request for detailed
proposals in the middle of the first round of hearings.132 Then,
while support for a legislative moratorium on toll road
privatizations was growing, TxDOT quietly entered into a
concession agreement for a section of State Highway 130, not
even issuing a press release following the event.1 33  The
129 See Feiser, supra note 96, at 29.
130 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 227.013 (Vernon 2008).
131 See Roger Croteau, Rural Areas Wary of Trans-Texas Plan, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 16, 2005, at B1.
132 See id.
133 The only indication that an agreement had been signed was an update to a
web page listing "Comprehensive Developments Agreements," which changed the
project's listed status from "negotiations ongoing" to "Date Signed: March 22, 2007."
Tex. Dep't of Transp., Comprehensive Development Agreements,
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Department's timing indicated that it had little interest in
incorporating any public comment into its decision-making. 
134
TxDOT also created enemies within the state government.
The Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, a legislative committee
that recommends whether agency enabling statutes should be
renewed, released to the legislature a scathing critique of the
bidding process, stating that "distrust permeated most of
TxDOT's actions" and determined that "it could not be an
effective state transportation agency if trust and confidence were
not restored."135 The Commission's recommendations included a
reworking of the planning and development process and utilizing
"[consistent and] meaningful public involvement."136  The
backlash eventually led to the redesign of some projects, the
abandonment of others, and a complete overhaul of the state's
road privatization enabling statute.137
In Pennsylvania, the governor and his financial advisors
planned, collected bids for, and negotiated a complete contract for
the lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, largely behind closed
doors, before the legislature had even considered enabling
legislation to allow the practice. 138  Some lawmakers naturally
bristled at this turn of events, and the proposed legislation did
http://www.txdot.gov/business/partnerships/cda.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009); see
TxDOT Secretly Signed Toll Concession at the Height of the Moratorium Furore,
TOLL ROADS NEWS, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/65.
134 See Tex. Dep't of Transp., TTC-35 Project Milestones, available at
http://ttc.keeptexasmoving.com/projects/ttc35/milestones.aspx. TxDOT held its first
round public hearings, introducing the project and soliciting public comments, from
April to June 2004 and issued a request for proposals in April. Id. The final round of
public hearings, gathering comments about possible routes, took place from
February through the end of March 2005, and the comprehensive development
agreement was signed on March 11. Id.
135 SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, TEX. DEP'T OF TRANSP., STAFF REPORT 1 (2008)
(on file with St. John's Law Review).
136 Id. at 35.
137 Act of June 11, 2007, ch. 264, 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 458 (West),
(substantial revision to the state's toll road privatization statute, described in detail
infra Part IV.B); see Rad Sallee, Trans-Texas Corridor Plans Take a Detour: State
Rules Out Building Roads Through Rural Areas and Now Says It Will Stick to Major
Highways, HOUSTON CHRON., June 11, 2008 ("The Texas Department of
Transportation ... abandoned plans to build [new roadways] through rural areas [as
part of TTC-69] . .. ."); Feds Order TxDOT Halt on US281 Toll Lanes Work North of
San Antonio, TOLL ROADS NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.tollroadsnews.com/
node/1411 (describing how TxDOT plans for US-281 project were cancelled after
public lawsuits led to withdrawal of FHWA approval).
138 See Scolforo, supra note 12.
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not pass in time for the deal to go through.1 39 Thus, a lack of
transparency may well have contributed to the demise of the two
largest toll road privatizations planned to date.
Given that one major goal of privatization is the injection of
market competition into areas formerly under the sole purview of
governments, it makes sense that public agencies should be
included among the entities who submit bids for work to be
contracted out.14° In effect, public employees should be afforded
the opportunity to compete for their jobs.' Although up until
now, public entities have not been able to participate in bidding
once a privatization decision is made, the Federal Highway
Administration is currently considering amending its rules in
order to allow the practice.14 The amendment would allow a
public entity to either submit a bid for itself or join a team with
other entities to submit a bid.14 The rule change is important in
order to allow the greatest possible competition at the only
competitive phase in a lease process. Once a contract has been
awarded, the state is bound to one provider for the term of the
lease. This leaves citizens with only the barest of consumer
choices with respect to the privatized service: Buy it, or forgo
it. 144
2. Post-Decision Accountability
With no opportunity for either exit or amendment, the
current structure of toll road leases leaves state governments
with few ways of holding toll road companies accountable for the
service they provide. Post-decision accountability requires that
government officials who enter into contracts for the provision of
public services be held responsible for the consequences. 45 The
139 Nussbaum, supra notel2.
140 See Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in
Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2470, 2504 (2003).
141 See id. at 2504.
142 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,908, 58,909-10 (Oct. 8,
2008).
143 Id. at 58,910.
144 A citizen may not have the luxury of forgoing the service if his or her
residence, particularly in a remote area, renders use of the toll road an unavoidable
necessity.
145 Minow, supra note 16, at 1266 ("The polity must ensure that governments, as
representatives of the public, retain the option to exit relationships with private
entities, the means to express disagreements with the ways in which the private
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maintenance of an opportunity for exit is part of the
legitimization of any public action. 146 The length of current toll
road leases eliminates this fundamental democratic value, as
states can only "buy back" leases at prohibitively high prices
under terms of default. Public entities should also retain the
opportunity to amend contracts in the future.147 Yet current toll
road leases in the United States lack any meaningful opportunity
to amend. All of the clauses affecting tolls, congestion, and
competition are decided in advance, to remain in effect for the
duration of the lease. Again, a measure of accountability is
thereby lost. Without either the opportunity to exit or amend
agreements, a government has little way of managing future
tensions between competing goals in toll road leases and no way
of holding the toll road company accountable for problems that
arise from those conflicts.
Future generations directly affected by the privatization
decision will have no opportunity to hold any elected official
accountable for the decision. Where, as in toll road leases, the
public is bound to a contract for three or more generations, it is
unlikely that the original parties to the agreement will still be
living-never mind still be in office-when its repercussions are
still being felt. This is political buck-passing. One generation of
politicians reaps the benefit of an up-front cash payment today,
leaving future citizens to live under a state government with no
control over the toll rates on its roads and no right to the
revenues generated.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CONCERNS RAISED
Given that the financial benefits of toll road privatization
will likely continue to attract the interest of state governments, it
makes sense to look for solutions to problems raised by this new
form of highway management. In order to increase sunshine and
accountability in privatizations, some academics urge expansion
of laws such as the Freedom of Information Act and the
Administrative Procedures Act to reach private sector companies
entities proceed, and the capacity to remain with the private entity as a vote of
confidence.").
146 See Ilya Somin, Note, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 753,
761 (2000).
147 Aman, supra note 75, at 1502 (urging "[niegotiation, flexibility, feedback and
opportunit[y] to amend" approaches to social policy issues).
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that contract to provide public services 11 or argue that certain
constitutional constraints should apply in cases of
privatizations. 4 9 Others have pointed out that privatization
actually affords an opportunity to expand, rather than curtail the
scope of public law values. 5 ° Jody Freeman and others have
suggested that through the careful use of tools including
legislation and specific contracting, privatizations can be
structured in ways that support accountability."' These tools are
particularly appropriate here. As they enact or amend laws to
enable toll road privatizations and negotiate agreements with toll
road operators, states have already begun to wrestle with the
promise and potential problems in road privatizations, testing
and implementing a variety of solutions. This Part will propose
specific laws and contract terms to strengthen accountability and
to resolve the major tensions arising from the conflicting goals of
toll road privatizations. It will also evaluate legislation and
contracts that states have employed up to this point, in light of
these goals.
A. Contracting Tools
In toll road privatizations, as in other forms of privatization,
a contract has the potential to promote social policies and public
law values. 152 For agreements that will bind the state for forty or
more years, it is vital that contract provisions adequately protect
the interests of both parties and the affected constituencies from
potential problems arising from conflicting goals and diminished
accountability. States can address key terms at one of three
stages in the contracting process: They can incorporate
mandatory contract provisions into their enabling laws, specify
contract terms in their requests for proposals, or negotiate for
them in the bidding and negotiation process. At one of these
three stages, states should use their contracts to anticipate and
balance the competing goals of revenue collection on the one
' Id. at 1500-01; Crowder, supra note 96, at 624-25.
149 Metzger, supra note 81, at 1456-71 (proposing that private delegation
doctrine be restructured to subject to special scrutiny those types of privatization
most likely to threaten constitutional accountability).
150 Freeman, supra note 87, at 1285.
11 See id. at 1285-86; Arnold, supra note 16, at 602-03 (pertaining to water
infrastructure); Dickinson, supra note 16, at 385 (pertaining to foreign affairs
contracts).
152 Dickinson, supra note 16, at 401.
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hand, and overall traffic mitigation on the other. Yet thus far,
toll road leases and concession agreements in the United States
have not built in adequate terms to protect the future interests of
the states and their citizens.
States do use their toll road contracts to specify the level of
service the toll road operator should provide. Contracting for
performance targets is easier on specific, concrete issues. The
toll road concessions to date generally do a good job addressing
issues of safety, construction quality, environmental protection,
and service levels. For example, the proposed Pennsylvania
Agreement consists of a 132-page contract plus over 500 pages of
attached schedules. 153  Schedule 8, Mandatory Capital
Improvements, lists by name and location all of the bridges to be
repaired, the on-ramps to be reconstructed, the toll plazas to be
upgraded, and the lanes to be widened during the first ten years
of the lease term.'54 Schedule 1 is an extensive operations
manual, with such detailed terms as a protocol for response to
"animal incidents," including a mandated time frame for the
removal of any resulting animal carcasses-eight hours. 155
Addressing public safety, all of the concession agreements to date
contain provisions describing the state police's jurisdiction over
the roadway and arrange for police protection, usually with
corresponding compensation from the toll road operator to the
state. If states wish to impose specific, concrete terms of
operation on a private partner, contracts can certainly contain
the level of detail necessary to do so.
Some needs are harder to anticipate and address by contract,
but it can be done. States should tackle the other issues, such as
congestion relief and competition, through new contract
provisions, better designed to address future needs. The
foremost difficulty lies in the length of the lease agreements
themselves. Already, the United States has seen toll road
agreements running up to ninety-nine years in length. 1 6 Some
states attempt to address this issue squarely by capping term
- See PA. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PENNSYLVANIA TuRNPIKE CONCESSION AND LEASE
AGREEMENT, DOe. NO. 1408172.43, available at ftp://ftp.dot.state.pa.us/public/
Bureaus/Press/PA%20Turnpike%20Concession.pdf [hereinafter LEASE AGREEMENT].
4 See id. sched. 8.
155 See id. sched. 1, vol. 1, §§ J.3.3, J.4.4.
1'6 See, e.g., Northwest Parkway in Colorado Concessioned to Brisa for $603m-
Lease Signed Today, Closing by Oct, TOLL ROADS NEWS, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/31 10.
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limits via their enabling legislation, with ceilings ranging from
thirty to seventy-five years. 157 One option states should consider
is limiting all toll road concession agreements to the term
required for the private company to fully depreciate the asset for
tax purposes. But even up to thirty, forty, or fifty years, states
should proceed with extreme caution. As discussed in detail
earlier, the long lease terms of currently drafted contracts
increase the potential for a costly exchange of up-front financial
benefits at the expense of future harms. 158
Some states seek to manage the potential harms with
rate caps. Pennsylvania attempted to avoid Indiana's
shortsightedness by removing the GDP-indexed option from the
toll cap equation in its proposed contract, but it also raised the
basic "floor" increase cap from 2 percent to 2.5 percent. 15 9 In the
long term, this arrangement could prove even more insidious.
One analyst explained that because the toll road increases do not
need to fall, or even stay steady in times of recession, the existing
formulae do not result in the kind of "leveling out" we would see
in most economic sectors during times of recession. 160  One
analyst concluded that applying the maximum permitted toll
increases under the Chicago Skyway lease to New York's Holland
Tunnel over its first seventy years of operation would have
resulted in a permitted toll as high as $185 by 2007.6 This was
in large part because the "floor" provision would have permitted
toll increases during the Great Depression, compounding the
increases achieved during boom times.'62 Only time will tell
whether the Indiana formula, with its inclusion of a GDP-
indexed option, or the Pennsylvania formula, with its higher
"floor" cap, will allow for greater increases.
Other states intend to limit potential abuses by limiting the
investor's annual rate of return. A few states approach this with
contract provisions that limit the company's rate of return on
investment to a specified amount, with excess profits either
folded back into the project or paid to the state.1 63 This could
157 See FLA. STAT. § 334.30 (2008) (seventy-five-year limit).
1' See supra Part III.B.2.
159 LEASE AGREEMENT, supra note 153, sched. 2, § 3(a)(iii).
'60 See CHICAGO SKYWAY SALE, supra note 70, at 2.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2006 (2008).
[Vol. 83:351
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
have the effect of keeping tolls at a reasonable level, while
providing the toll operator with the ability to make financial
projections well into the future. However, it may also prevent
the toll road operator from achieving an appropriate investment
return at a time of economic prosperity. Florida requires that
concession agreements include a formula for revenue sharing
between the concessionaire and the state.164  Thoughtfully
structured, a revenue-sharing formula could provide a better
incentive than an inflexible cap on rate of return: If the
operator's share of the pie decreases as its revenues increase,
there is less to be gained from revenues in excess of optimal
usage.
Legislation to address planning for congestion problems is
much less common. After its sour experience with SR-91,
California amended its legislation to ban noncompetition
clauses. 165  The federal government also bans noncompetition
clauses in leases affecting the Interstate Highway System. 66
Texas, in its 2007 amendments, also banned noncompetition
clauses; 6 ' Florida has a similar ban. 66  California and Texas
allow some compensation to be given back to the toll road
operator for toll revenues lost due to competition.' 69  Merely
limiting, or putting a price tag on, noncompetition agreements,
however, does not address the problem of pricing.1 70 Nor do toll
cap provisions or even rate-of-return caps provide adequate
assurance that the operators will set tolls at anywhere near the
optimal level from the point of view of congestion relief, and the
164 FLA. STAT. § 334.30(2)(e) (2008). The Texas State Highway 130 Concession
employs revenue sharing. TEX. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FACILITY CONCESSION
AGREEMENT: SH 130 SEGMENTS 5 AND 6 FACILITY, DOC. No. 324869_12,
§ 5.1.2 (2007), available at ftp://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/tta/shl30_cda/facil_
concession agmt.pdf; id. exhibit 7, pt. B, available at ftp://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/
txdot-info/tta/sh130_ cda/exhibit_7.pdf.
165 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 45.
16 See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1604(c), 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
167 See Act of June 11, 2007, ch. 264, 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 458, 483,
§ 371.103 (West).
16' See FLA. STAT. § 337.251 (2008).
169 See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 143(d)(3) (West 2008); GAO REPORT, supra
note 5, at 4.
176 For contract terms that could serve to address this issue, see infra this Part.
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extraordinarily long terms of the concession agreements make
peering into the future difficult.17'
A better potential solution is to require some renegotiation at
intervals throughout the term of the contract. As suggested by
Alfred C. Aman, privatization contracts are best not ossified.172
They "should be seen as part of an evolving process of
governance, not the final culmination of private negotiations."7
Instead, states should write contracts to anticipate competing
goals and provide a framework for future amendment.
This route is not entirely unprecedented. Spain, for one, has
incorporated a "rebalancing" concept into contracts with some of
its toll road concessionaires, requiring the government and the
concessionaire to sit down every five years to negotiate the
structure of tolls and noncompetition agreements, including
possible repayments from the government to the private entity
should the optimal balance result in economic losses.174 Of
course, requiring a complete renegotiation of a concession
agreement mid-term would so reduce the value of the toll road
asset that it would likely become difficult to attract a
concessionaire under such terms. However, careful contracting
can provide a framework for something similar to Spain's
"rebalancing."
Despite the tax-driven necessity of long lease terms,
contracts should be constructed as flexibly as possible to address
future concerns. The toll pricing provisions of toll road
concessions should balance the concessionaire's expected return
on investment against state's goals of transportation access and
regional traffic mitigation, rather than simply employing rate
caps that adjust for economic growth and recession. Some states
attempt to balance competing economic goals by mandating
either a maximum rate of return or some form of profit-sharing.
Although this may prove useful, it still does not directly address
171 In addition to the issues discussed herein, one state legislature has recently
addressed foreign ownership of toll road operators, and one has specified that tolling
automatically be suspended during a state of emergency when the road is a
designated evacuation route. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-3-106 (2008) (requiring any
private partner to be more than 50 percent U.S.-owned); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-43-
3(5) (2008) (requiring the cessation of toll collection on an evacuation route during
an emergency).
172 See Aman, supra note 75, at 1502.
173 Id.
174 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the potential for a concessionaire to raise rates to a point that
will reduce road traffic beyond optimal levels. True balancing of
the concerns of the state, its road users, and the concessionaire
would take into account the level of road usage. For example, toll
rates might adjust in accordance with traffic studies to achieve
rates that would result in ideal usage of both the tollway and the
surrounding roads while allowing for an investment return for
the operator. Tolls should be set high enough that, in areas of
traffic congestion, users will experience some savings of time
from using the toll roads but low enough that the congestion on
the nearby roads will not undermine the state's transportation
goals.
B. Legislative Tools
Because federal law does not mandate the detailed level of
review that toll road privatization decisions need, states should
embed such review into their enabling legislation. State
legislation must address both the substantive and procedural
concerns that arise in toll road privatizations. Existing state
enabling statutes vary widely in the degree of public involvement
1751 o
required in the decision-making process, some of which serve
serving as models other states should follow. States, however,
impose fewer requirements affecting the substance of the lease
agreement itself.176 In order to insure that the terms discussed
above are incorporated in lease agreements, state legislatures
should consider adding a framework for inclusion of such terms
in their road lease agreements.
Federal law imposes few public-process requirements onto
toll road privatizations with federal involvement. Where a road
project will involve federal funding or will affect the Interstate
175 Compare, e.g., 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7.5 (2008) (allowing public input at
board meetings), with IND. CODE ANN. § 8-15.7-4-6 (2008) (allowing the department
to keep information confidential).
176 Several states do not, by legislation, impose any specific contract provisions
such as the rate of return caps, revenue sharing provisions, noncompetition clauses,
or lease term limits. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 21-1-80, 23-1-81 (2008) (authorizing
county officials to "license any ... legal entity to establish or to operate toll roads,
toll bridges, ferries, or causeways and authorize the licensee to establish and fix the
rates of toll," but imposing no requirements on the term of such license); GA. CODE
ANN. § 32-2-80(a) (2008) (exempting toll road contracts from state public bidding
requirements, and only requiring that they "be in compliance with all other
applicable federal and state laws").
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Highway System, environmental and other notice and comment
requirements apply.'77 Federal laws do not impose any review
process, however, for the lease of already-existing roadways that
are not part of the Interstate Highway System where federal
funding is not used. 78 States also impose environmental review
requirements, which vary from state to state. 7 9
States should not wait for a mandatory federal-or state-
required environmental review process to seek citizen input on a
decision as important as a road privatization. States should
address the substantive concerns of toll-setting, congestion relief,
and noncompete agreements in their legislation, and many have
made attempts to do so. Fewer states, however, address the need
for a public process for citizen input. Such legislation should
require meaningful public and legislative input in decision
making and a broader range of stakeholders represented, which
could enable a more public contracting process, allowing a wider
range of stakeholders a seat at the table.18 0
Even absent sweeping changes to federal laws such as the
Freedom of Information Act, states can amend their own
enabling statutes to make any toll road bidding and leasing
process more public and inclusive and to address the potential
conflicting goals that arise in toll road privatizations. As
scholars have suggested in other privatization contexts, states
can use their enabling legislation to expand the reach of public
law norms to the private sector by embedding into their
privatization laws tools for enhancing democracy and
accountability.' This Subpart examines both the Federal
177 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (2008) (requiring
through the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and corresponding
regulations an environmental impact statement and comments from the public and
interested groups for "major [I] ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment"); see also 23 U.S.C. § 128 (2000) (requiring states planning
federal-aid highway projects or projects on the Interstate Highway System to hold
public hearings).
178 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59-60.
179 Only seventeen states, plus D.C., Guam, and Puerto Rico, even have a
NEPA-equivalent statute. See Council on Envtl. Quality, State Environmental
Planning Information, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/states/states.cfm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2009).
180 Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strategies
for Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 282-84, 299 (advocating citizen participation at
the bidding stage of contracts).
181 See Freeman, supra note 87, at 1339.
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Highway Administration's Model Statute and the existing state
road privatization enabling statutes to see how they fare in
addressing the issues, then proposes specific legislation and
contracting terms that states should consider.
The Federal Highway Authority ("FHWA") has produced
draft model legislation as a guide for states to use in crafting
their own road privatization statutes.1 2 As written, the FHWA's
model statute could serve as a "model" for a lack of democratic
participation and transparency.13  It covers such issues as
bidding, reversion of the highway to the state at the end of the
lease term, remedies upon default, bonds, federal financing,
property tax exemptions, and police powers.88 At the same time,
it closes off any existing avenues for public accountability.'l8 A
state following the model legislation would first specify that the
state's normal procurement procedures do not apply, 8 6 then
leave all discretion in road privatization decisions to the state's
executive branch,"8 7 providing for no information sharing with
either the legislature or the public. For determining which
material from bids should be public and which should remain
"confidential," the FHWA proposes two alternatives, both
involving only the transportation department and the private
company, with no third-party review or oversight.'88
States' laws show considerable variety in addressing
accountability concerns. Many toll road privatization statutes
follow the model statute in leaving all decision-making power in
the hands of the executive branch and offering very little in the
way of notice, comment, or review by either the legislature or the
public.8 9 A few states require that any toll road concession
negotiated by the transportation department also receive
182 MODEL PUB. PRIVATE P'SHIPS LEGISLATION (U.S. Dep't of Transp. Fed.
Highway Admin., Working Draft), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/pdf/legis -model.pdf.
183 See id. §§ 1-102(d)(5), (g)(1)-(5), 1-103(c)(2)-(7) (allowing, despite limited
input from the public, the government, and the private entity to keep crucial
information private).
184 Id. §§ 1-106 to -109, -111.
185 See id. §§ 1-102(d)(5), (g)(1)-(5), 1-103(c)(2)-(7).
186 See id. § 1-102(a).
187 See id. § 1-102(b).
181 Id. § 1-102(g).
189 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 23-1-80-81 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-1-1204
(2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-2-79-80 (2008); MO. §§ 227.600-69 (2008). The
Missouri statute specifies that an agreement becomes an open record only after its
execution. Id. § 227.627.
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approval from the state legislature. 190 Some states require some
notice to or approval from local governing entities' 91 or notice to
the public before a toll road privatization decision.192 Arizona's
statute mandates both: It requires public notice and comment
and also allows local governmental jurisdictions to review toll
road applications, requiring local approval of the engineering
design of any connections to local roads. 9 3 California mandates
that the lease be submitted to the legislature, along with
comments from at least one public hearing and permits a
legislative veto within sixty days. 194
Washington State has an unusually broad scheme for
involving a wide range of stakeholders in the decision-making
process. Among its stated legislative purposes is a declaration
that any transportation PPP "shall be implemented in
cooperation, consultation, and with the support of the affected
communities and local jurisdictions."'95  The statute mandates
the creation of a "local involvement committee," including
representatives of any groups formed in opposition to the project
and further allows an advisory vote by road users and area
residents. 196 Washington also stipulates that if more than 5,000
signatures are gathered in opposition to a project, the
transportation department must then consider alternatives and
vote for their preference. 197
190 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2003(b) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-3-102(b)
(2008) (requiring approval of general assembly); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-6-
118(3) (2008) (requiring legislative approval to toll existing free roads, but no
approval needed to lease or transfer already-tolled roads).
'9' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2003(e)(2) (2008) (requiring approval by the "directly
affected metropolitan planning organization[s]"); MINN. STAT. § 160.85 subdiv. 3
(2008) (granting veto right to affected jurisdictions); OR. REV. STAT. § 383.013(2),
§ 383.015(2)(a) (2008) (requiring department to "solicit ... recommendation[s]" from
and consider the "opinions and interests" of affected jurisdictions); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-563(A)-(B) (2008) (requiring notice to affected jurisdictions).
192 These four states are Arizona, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-7701(E)-(F) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-3-113(d)(1)
(requiring public hearings); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-573.1:1; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 47.46.040(8)-(9) (2008).
193 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-7701.E (requiring a public hearing and allowing
submission of comments by the public); id. § 28-7746 (requiring local jurisdiction
approval).
194 CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 143(b)(3) (West 2008).
195 WASH. REV. CODE § 47.46.010.
19 Id. § 47.46.030(3), (6)(a).
191 Id. § 47.46.030(6), (11).
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More recently, in June 2007, Texas passed a sweeping
overhaul to its own road privatization legislation.19 Widely
noted for its two-year moratorium on new toll road privatization
projects, the 2007 bill also represents an attempt to shine light
into the decision-making process by imposing a range of new
accountability requirements. In reaction to the secrecy of the
processes prior to that point, the legislature directed that TxDOT
"seek to achieve transparency" and mandated several reforms. 199
TxDOT must now provide public access to information about
proposed projects and must submit regular updates to the
legislature, the state comptroller, and others.2 °° It must also
publish certain financial data, including projected toll levels at
the end of the contract term.20 ' Following financial disclosures,
TxDOT must hold public hearings that include a mechanism for
responding to questions and contracts prior to entering into any
final contract.20 2 Within ten days after signing any final contract,
TxDOT must post the full contract on its website. °3
Increased transparency and democratic participation are
likely to yield the advantage of greater public support. The
relative secrecy of toll road negotiations to date is doubtless due
to a perception that too much attention will only fan the flames of
public outcry. In fact, the exact opposite is true: Secrecy breeds
suspicion, as recent experiences in Texas and Pennsylvania
illustrate. State leadership should instead present the case for
any proposed toll road lease from the outset, soliciting input
about the proposal and its alternatives from financial experts,
affected jurisdictions, environmental and trade groups, and
affected citizens. Should the privatization option turn out to be
the most beneficial to the state, citizens will have had an
opportunity to examine this and the state will have had the
opportunity to incorporate suggested improvements. To be sure,
198 See generally Act of June 11, 2007, ch. 264, 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 458
(West).
199 TEX. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 227.005 (Vernon 2008).
200 Id. § 227.005(b).
201 Id. § 371.151.
202 Id. § 371.153.
203 Id. § 223.210 (describing a two-year moratorium); id. § 227.005 (setting
forth various transparency provisions); id. § 227.006 (describing web posting
requirements).
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some opposition will remain-but to conduct negotiations in
secret is a virtual guarantee for such opposition. °4
Texas' new public disclosure requirements should serve as a
model to other states. The laws mandate a level of disclosure,
notice, and comment appropriate for a democratic form of
government. In addition, states should employ a provision like
that in California, where the legislature has a reasonable window
of time in which to veto the proposed arrangement if it does not
serve the public interest.2 5  Using a transparent and
participatory public process prior to a toll road privatization
decision, the transportation department and the legislature can
act with the benefit of knowledge about the proposal and any
alternative proposals, informed by the input of a variety of
perspectives and interests. This process would fully reflect the
values of a democratic republic where the elected executive and
elected legislators must ultimately come together and agree on
governance issues.
Additional process like that required by Washington State
will probably prove unworkable.0 6 In particular, administering
an election to obtain the "advisory" position of "users and
residents in the affected project area" could prove unworkable,
needlessly hindering the decision-making process. States should
neither impose a blanket ban on privatizations nor permit an
unworkable process to do so. Texas lawmakers in both
Washington, D.C. and Austin, meanwhile, continue to consider
how they might curb further toll roads and toll road
privatizations. 20 7  This backlash may be due, in part, to the
204 See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 177-87 (2007) (applying this principle to
other infrastructure privatizations).
205 CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 143(b)(3) (West 2008).
206 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 47.46.030(6), (11), 47.46.040(8)-(9) (2008).
207 Several members of Texas' U.S. congressional delegation have expressed
opposition to Governor Perry's proposed Trans-Texas Corridor. Bennet
Roth & Stuart Powell, TxDOT Repairing Political Bridges, HOUSTON CHRON.,
May 25, 2008, at Al. U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison inserted
into an appropriations bill a ban on tolling existing roads; the bill passed.
Pub. L. 110-61, 207 H.R. 2674, § 197. State Senator Kim Nichols approved
of Hutchison's measure and also floated the idea of a ban on foreign
investment in Texas roads, which would considerably restrict any potential
pool of bidders. Robert Nichols, The Good, the Bad, & the Ugly: Part 2,
Nichols Opposes Converting Existing Roads to Toll Roads, Sept. 17, 2007, available
at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/members/dist3/prO7/pO91707a.htm; Fort
Worth Star Telegram, Officials: Corridor a Bad Word, But Need Real, Mar. 28, 2008,
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manner in which the governor and his financial advisors pursued
the initial plan. And yet, a ban on toll road privatizations,
whether imposed by legislative enactment or by excessive
procedural hurdles, might not best serve the interests of a state.
A de facto ban on road privatizations would at least take one
transportation financing option off the table at a time when
states are trying to find an option that works.
In many privatizations, scholars have also noted the
importance of building increased post-decision monitoring and
oversight into agreements. 218 State laws addressing post-decision
management of the conflicting goals inherent in these kinds of
privatizations are rare. Two states do require a public hearing
before any toll increases,"°9 while Washington prohibits toll
increases before its "citizen advisory committee" has had a
chance to review them.21 ° No state addresses the need to balance
terms such as rate of return and competition into the future.
States can improve accountability during the term of the
lease itself by requiring periodic review of the lease and a
rebalancing of interests between the private toll road operator
and the public affected by transportation infrastructure. Rather
than employ a review process that addresses only the narrow
issue of toll increases, state laws should mandate a review
process that considers the investor's rate of return and the traffic
mitigation, mobility, and environmental needs of the state.
C. Potential Objections to Solutions Proposed
Many privatization proponents do not fear the erosion of
accountability that troubles some legal scholars. They advise
that in privatizations, market accountability will prove superior
to traditional democratic accountability regimes.211 In this view,
available at http://nl.newsbank.comlnl-search/we/Archives; see also Kristin
Edwards, Kolkhorst: There Are Other Road Options, HUNTSVILLE ITEM,
Jan. 31, 2008, available at http://www.itemonline.com/archivesearch/local_
story_031010347.html (describing State Representative Lois Kolkhorst's opposition
to toll road privatizations).
20 Ellen Dannin, supra note 90, at 258, 270; Donald G. Featherstun et al., State
and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 652 (2001).
209 CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 143(e)(2) (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-43-
3(4) (2008).
210 WASH. REV. CODE § 47.46.090 (2008).
211 See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1448 (2003).
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as market accountability extends into a realm of privatized
services, the need for legal accountability will then diminish.212
For example, airline deregulation has allowed consumers and
shareholders to "vote with their feet," resulting in a kind of
consumer and market "democracy" that is ultimately more
responsive to the public's needs than is government regulation.213
In this view, legal mechanisms for accountability amount to so
much "red tape" that serves as a barrier to efficiency and fails to
achieve the substance of democratic process.214
This argument is not persuasive in the context of toll roads.
Here, the only market competition occurs at the selection of the
winning bidder. To date, state transportation agencies select
concessionaires with limited input from the people who will
eventually use the roads. At no point does the citizen, the person
ultimately affected by the decision to privatize, ever influence the
decision. In the toll road context, this weakens arguments that
favor the accountability of the market over democratic
accountability.215  The operator who wins the concession
essentially purchases a seventy-five-year monopoly. After the
lease decision, it is certainly true that users can avoid the roads
since there is generally a parallel route. But because some
number of consumers will pay a very high premium to travel the
toll road, the incentives of the market are not properly balanced
with the incentives of industry. Additionally, the individual
users are not the only people affected; surrounding communities
might see greater congestion. These factors make the pre-
decision accountability mechanisms outlined here crucial.
Other critics might contend that accountability regimes
serve little purpose in reality. Given the citizenry's actual lack of
participation in politics, these authors see governance as driven
by various self-seeking groups, with results that do not reflect a
general public good.216  This argument, however, does not
212 See id.
213 Aman, supra note 75, at 1493-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Erhardt, supra note 115 (proposing relaxed environmental review processes
for private toll road operators in order to maximize efficiency in highway
privatizations); Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 211, at 1448-49; cf Dannin,
supra note 73, at 117-20.
215 Diller, supra note 16, at 1745.
216 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-
Adminstrative Impulse, in PUBLIC AccOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
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diminish the importance of democratic accountability in this
context. In reality, the amalgam of pressures and interests that
produce any act of governance is likely to be a synthesis of the
interests of community members as well as those of interest
groups and the personal interests of those in power. 217 Given this
reality, those affected by governance must be afforded at least
some opportunity to be informed of and express their views
regarding government decisions.
A final objection, particularly from industry, is that overly-
specific contracting terms will undermine the initial goals of
privatization, especially the goals of raising funds and taking
advantage of innovations offered by the private sector.218 In this
view, the less interference the better, beyond what is necessary
to prevent fraud and abuse.2"9 But where potential for abuse
exists, including abuse in the form of excessive user fees, specific
contracting is still necessary. Even with rebalancing provisions
and careful public oversight, toll road leases can leave plenty of
room for innovation. For example, toll road operators have
already developed innovations in automated toll collection, traffic
management, and accident response processes.
Private entities may not stand to gain as much financially
from these toll road deals if we rein in their wide latitude to raise
tolls and to stifle competition. With less to gain, toll road
operators may be reluctant to invest large sums up front.
Ultimately, these dollar losses need to be balanced against the
public interests retained. If the deal will not be worth it to a
future generation, then we should not be willing to enter into it
for the sake of dollars today.
CONCLUSION
State governments face potential benefits and risks from toll
road privatizations. In order to maximize the benefits and
control the risks, state legislatures can first amend their
enabling legislation to allow toll road privatizations only after a
transparent and participatory public process. They should also
consider embedding term limits into their legislation and should
EXPERIENCES, supra note 80, at 57-59 (noting that few people even know the names
of their local elected officials, much less the policies they stand for).
217 See generally Cass, supra note 71, at 471-80.
218 GoMEz-IBANEZ & MEYER, supra note 19, at 74.
219 Id.
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incorporate provisions into lease agreements that require a
periodic reexamination of critical public issues. State governors
and transportation departments, in turn, should negotiate
contracts that allow for flexibility with respect to the future
needs of the state.
The consequences of faulty toll leases will be real and long
lasting. Once an agreement is signed, it essentially grants a
long-term monopoly to a critical public asset. The contract
should not compromise core democratic values in the process.
Even if new contract provisions result in a reduced expected
income for the toll road company and, therefore, a reduced up-
front payment to the state, it is critical to balance the public
interests against the private in toll road deals. Some values
should not be up for bid.
